CookLabON-CHAIN CULTURELaunch token
PROTOCOL ONLINEONE PROGRAM1B FIXED SUPPLYTWO-PHASE FEESTELEGRAM NATIVESOLANA SPEED PROTOCOL ONLINEONE PROGRAM1B FIXED SUPPLYTWO-PHASE FEESTELEGRAM NATIVESOLANA SPEED
WhitepaperAssuranceSecurity model
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Assurance

Security model

Canonical CookLab whitepaperProduct & protocol specification · Version 3.0
PROTECTED
01 SUPPLY LOCK02 ATOMIC SETTLEMENT03 MINIMIZED AUTHORITY
CANONICAL STATE / VERIFIED

CookLab protects value by separating what must be trusted, what can be verified, and what is deliberately impossible. Security is designed as a set of narrowing boundaries around canonical Solana state.

INTERFACETelegram · WebOPERATIONSAPI · Indexer · RPCPROTOCOLProgram · AccountsCANONICAL STATE
TRUST SURFACE / 04 LAYERS

Convenience can fail.
Correctness cannot.

If an interface, indexer, or RPC provider disappears, token ownership and protocol state remain independently verifiable on Solana.

FAIL CLOSEDVERIFY ON-CHAINMINIMIZE AUTHORITY
THREATCONTROLRESULT
Unauthorized supply

Mint and freeze authority revoked during launch finalization.

IMPOSSIBLE BY DESIGN
Manipulated settlement

Signer, PDA, reserve, arithmetic, ownership, and slippage checks execute atomically.

TRANSACTION REVERTS
Custody exposure

Direct web trades remain in the user's wallet. Optional bot wallets use authenticated encryption, isolated secrets, and explicit withdrawal review.

USER CHOOSES THE TRUST MODEL
Infrastructure failure

Derived services rebuild from finalized program events and canonical account state.

STATE SURVIVES
DEEP DIVE

CookLab’s security model distinguishes protocol risk, custody risk, interface risk, and infrastructure risk. Controls are layered because no single mechanism addresses all four.

01

Protocol threats

The on-chain program must defend against forged accounts, incorrect signers, arithmetic overflow, duplicate settlement, reserve insolvency, premature vesting, and unauthorized lifecycle transitions.

  • Ownership and PDA checks
  • Checked arithmetic and bounded inputs
  • Atomic transfers and state updates
  • Explicit lifecycle guards
02

Custody and interface threats

Trading currently uses the Telegram managed wallet. This creates operational custody risk, mitigated by authenticated encryption, explicit transaction parameters, confirmation steps, withdrawal review, and secret isolation. Website trading is disabled for now.

  • Telegram is the primary trading path
  • Authenticated encryption protects bot wallets
  • Secrets excluded from source control
  • No private keys in logs or chat
  • User-verifiable transaction receipts
03

Residual risk

Smart-contract defects, validator or RPC disruption, Telegram account compromise, and user device compromise cannot be eliminated by interface design. Production readiness requires independent audit, incident response, and conservative rollout.

  • Audit before unrestricted mainnet use
  • Rate limits and anomaly monitoring
  • Multisignature administrative authority
  • Documented pause and recovery procedures